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Abstract. Scientific knowledge is an important ingredient in the innovation process. Drawing on 
the knowledge-based view of the firm and the literature on the relationship between science and 
technology, this paper scrutinizes the importance of university scientists’ mobility for firms’ 
innovative activities. Combining patent data and matched employer-employee data for Danish 
firms, we can track the labor mobility of R&D workers from 1999 to 2004. We find that new 
joiners contribute more than long-term employees to innovative activity in the focal firm. Among 
new firm recruits, we observe that newly hired former university researchers contribute more to 
innovative activity than newly hired recent graduates or joiners from firms, but only in firms 
with a high level of absorptive capacity in the form of recent experience of hiring university 
researchers. We find also that firms’ recent experience of hiring university researchers enhances 
the effect of newly hired recent graduates’ contributions to innovation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Search is considered to be local when it involves knowledge that is close to the focal 
organization’s current knowledge base (Helfat, 1994). The advantages to firms that conduct local 
searches in the course of their problem-solving activities— including problem-solving related to 
innovation—are well known, and are among the reasons why local search tends to prevail 
(Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, too much reliance on local 
search could potentially be damaging or fatal for the organization (Levinthal & Rerup, 2006; 
Levinthal & March, 1993; March, 1991; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000). An important way for private 
firms to overcome the local search problem relating to innovation is to use science. The role of 
science and scientists—or “philosophers and men of speculation” as scientists once were 
described1—in distant search and consequent innovative activity was noted by Adam Smith as 
early as 1776 in his Wealth of Nations: 
“Many improvements have been made by the ingenuity of the makers of the machines, when 
to make them became the business of a peculiar trade; and some by that of those who are called 
philosophers, or men of speculation, whose trade it is not to do anything, but to observe 
everything, and who, upon that account, are often capable of combining together the powers of 
the most distant and dissimilar objects in the progress of society…” (Smith, 1976: 10, emphasis 
added). 
Fleming and Sorenson (2004) point out that it was not until the second half of the 20th century 
that researchers began to test this link empirically, and to develop it further, from a theoretical 
point of view. An early empirical result in the innovation literature established that successful 
innovations compared to unsuccessful innovations, show a closer coupling with the scientific and 
                                                          
1
 See Pavitt (1991: 110). 
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technological community in relation to the specific innovation project (Rothwell, Freeman, 
Jervis, Robertson, & Townsend, 1974).  
Our study is concerned with the role of scientific skill in technological innovation in industrial 
firms. It is located within two streams of the research literature. The first strand is preoccupied 
with the role of science (and scientists) in industrial innovation; the second investigates labor 
mobility among organizational units in the context of innovation. The work within the first 
strand focuses on how science and university scientists contribute to the innovative efforts of 
private business firms (e.g., Cockburn & Henderson, 1998; Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Gibbons 
& Johnston, 1974; Gittelman, 2007; Jaffe, 1989; Liebeskind, Oliver, Zucker, & Brewer, 1996; 
Spencer, 2001). Within this body of work, Jaffe (1989), in a study of the extent of research and 
development (R&D) knowledge flows at US state level finds that corporate patenting responds 
positively to knowledge from academic research, providing evidence of the importance of 
geographical proximity for shaping the patterns of university-industry interaction. This suggests 
that the co-location of complementary resources may increase the opportunities for 
commercialization. Fleming and Sorenson (2004) point to the advantages of scientific thinking in 
technological search. They show that patents are more frequently cited if they contain references 
to scientific papers, and if the frequency of the patent subclasses that appear in combination with 
other subclasses, in other patents, is high (the authors describe this as “coupling”). In the context 
of high levels of coupling, Fleming and Sorenson argue that scientific knowledge and methods 
can serve as a “map” that helps to structure the search process more systematically. Along these 
lines, Gittelman (2006) finds that patents whose development involved scientists who had 
worked in a public lab before later joining a biotechnology firm, receive more citations than 
other patents. 
3 
 
The second strand in the literature focuses on labor mobility as a source of knowledge 
spillovers for innovative activity (e.g., Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Corredoira & Rosenkopf, 2010; 
Kaiser, Kongsted, & Rønde, 2011; Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Singh & Agrawal, 2011; Song, 
Almeida, & Wu, 2003; Tzabbar, 2009). For example, Rosenkopf and Almeida (2003) examine 
pairs of firms and show that dyads involved in high levels of mutual labor mobility are involved 
also in greater knowledge flows. As a consequence, inter-firm collaboration through alliances, 
combined with inter-firm labor mobility, might help to overcome the local search problem 
referred to above. Also, Tzabbar (2009) shows that the recruitment of technologically distant 
scientists is positively related to firm-level technological repositioning. In a paper that uses the 
Danish register data employed in our study, Kaiser, Kongsted and Rønde (2011) study the 
mobility of workers across private sector employers. They find that workers who transfer to a 
new firm from a previous employer that was involved in patenting, contribute substantially to 
their new employers’ patenting activity. They contribute more than joiners from non-patenting 
firms, or non-mobile workers. Their main finding, however, is that workers who leave to join a 
firm that patents, appear also to contribute to the patenting activity of their previous employer. 
They also promote stronger cross-citation between the two firms. 
While both these streams of research have produced important insights, they have some major 
limitations. The contributions in the first stream do not explicitly model the mechanisms by 
which industrial firms gain access to academic science and/or do not analyze how this access 
affects firm-level outcomes. The second group of work does explicitly model a mechanism 
(labor mobility), but typically looks at hirings from other industrial firms but not from 
universities. It looks also at how labor mobility affects the hiring firms’ technological search 
processes (reflected in patent citations), not their innovative output. Lastly, this literature relies 
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predominantly on patent data for measuring R&D worker mobility. This implies that only 
individual inventors whose names appear on patents registered before and after a move will 
count as mobile.   
The present study should help to fill some of these gaps. It analyzes the effect on private 
sector firm-level innovation of recruiting R&D workers from universities, controlling for and 
comparing the inward mobility of labor from other types of organizations. To our knowledge, 
this is the first paper to study this effect. Empirically, we can trace the mobility of all R&D 
workers in an entire economy and not just that of persons named on patents, before and after a 
move. The paper draws on the knowledge-based view of the firm and the literature on the 
relationship between science and innovation, to examine the importance of mobility of university 
scientists for firms’ innovative activities. Using these elements, we build a theory whose basic 
proposition is that firms’ hirings of university researchers can provide important support for 
boundary-spanning search that leads to more firm-level innovation. However, while university 
scientists often interact with private firms on the basis of aligned economic interests, they 
operate under very different incentive systems which reward the disclosure rather than the 
exploitation of knowledge (Breschi, Lissoni, & Montobbio, 2008; Dasgupta & David, 1994; 
Gittelman & Kogut, 2003). Therefore, there are significant initial costs involved in hiring 
university scientists. For this reasons we hypothesize that absorptive capacity, represented by 
experience of hiring university scientists in the past, is central to achieving benefit from this type 
of recruitment. 
We use a unique register data set on the entire population of Danish firms and their 
employees, for the period 1999 to 2004. These data allow us to measure the average innovation 
effects of public R&D workers moving to private firms. We link these data to the number of each 
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individual firm’s patent applications to the European Patent Office (EPO); this is our measure of 
innovation. The analysis focuses on firms that employ at least one R&D worker, since these 
firms are more likely to patent. It is based on 16,531 observations for 5,714 firms. The 
econometric analysis takes account of state dependence—past innovative activity is likely to 
have an impact on present innovation, and also unobserved firm-specific time-invariant 
heterogeneity—some firms may be inherently better at innovating than others, perhaps because 
of better management of R&D. We investigate the extent to which science or engineering 
graduates who join a private firm following employment as a university researcher after 
graduation (“joiners from universities”), contribute to the innovative output of the firm they join. 
We also consider the effects of recent science or engineering graduates who enter the private 
sector after graduation (“recent graduate joiners”). We contrast these impacts with the effects of 
R&D workers who either worked in another firm (“joiners from firms”) or have been employed 
only by the focal firm (“stayers”). In line with the literature, we find that firm joiners contribute 
more than stayers to innovative activity, that is, in the context of innovation, firms can engage in 
explorative learning through inward mobility of researchers. More importantly, we find that 
newly hired university researchers make a bigger contribution to innovative activity than newly 
hired recent graduates or joiners from other firms, but only if the hiring firm has recent 
experience of hiring university researchers. In addition, we find that firms’ recent experience of 
hiring university researchers enhances the effect of newly hired recent graduates’ contributions 
to innovative activity. 
EMPIRICAL AND THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
There is a long tradition in innovation studies (Fleming & Sorenson, 2004; Kogut & Zander, 
1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Schumpeter, 1912/1934) that proposes that innovation can be 
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conceptualized as resulting from the novel integration of previously separate bodies of 
knowledge that have commercial application. The knowledge-based view posits that a firm’s 
competitive advantage depends on its ability to combine initially separate knowledge and to 
recombine the resulting new knowledge to produce innovations, through a learning process that 
depends on the level of the given firm’s “combinative capabilities” to synthesize and apply 
current (firm-internal) and acquired (external) knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992). We build on 
this approach and examine the ability of firms to create new knowledge by recombining 
recombination knowledge from across organizational boundaries, i.e. combining their existing 
knowledge with new knowledge acquired via worker mobility. We focus particularly on the 
knowledge reconfiguration capabilities of firms by examining the inward mobility of university 
scientists. 
Our analysis starts from the premise that human capital is mobile since employees generally 
are free to quit and take up a new job at will, and that they carry with them some parts of the 
knowledge developed at the previous employer (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004; 
Campbell, Ganco, Franco, & Agarwal, 2012; Liebeskind, 1997). We assume also that some 
university scientists and other R&D workers are willing/able to move. The reasons commonly 
cited for university scientists moving to employment in industry are higher salaries, and in some 
cases, better research funding opportunities (see e.g., Agarwal & Ohyama, 2012; Roach & 
Sauermann, 2010), although the reasons for a move are not a central concern of the present 
paper.   
We adopt Nelson and Rosenberg’s (1994) view that universities conduct mostly basic 
research, aimed at understanding phenomena at a relatively fundamental level, although this is 
not to imply that such research is unaffected by the pull of important technological problems and 
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objectives. Nelson and Rosenberg (1994) suggest that the major share of industry R&D is aimed 
at shorter term problem-solving, design and development. Because the payoffs are more 
immediate and easier to appropriate than those from basic research, industry performs very little 
basic research and undertakes relatively little training of scientists in research skills. Since 
science is concerned mostly with explorative learning, firms often find academic science and 
scientific skills extremely useful complements to their internal capabilities when working on 
innovations. However, as we describe below, these more academic skills can be problematic for 
profit-motivated firms. 
HYPOTHESES 
Boundary-spanning through general labor mobility 
Our first hypothesis can be considered a “baseline hypothesis”. It corresponds with what is 
implied in the innovation and labor mobility literature (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003; Singh & 
Agrawal, 2011; Song et al., 2003), although this literature focuses on the effect of mobility on 
knowledge flows, and not on the level of innovative activity, the focus of the present paper. 
Innovative activities are largely firm-specific, local and cumulative, making inter-organizational 
transfer of useful knowledge difficult (Dosi, 1988; Szulanski, 1996). However, as Dosi (1988: 
1131) notes, “People can be hired away from one firm to another”, enabling the transfer of the 
skills and tacit knowledge related to innovation.  
The innovation literature (Cantwell, 1989; Helfat, 1994; Pavitt, 1988; Stuart & Podolny, 
1996; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000) suggests that initially, the organizational members should search 
for innovative solutions related to new processes, products, and services in areas where the 
organization already has expertise. Nelson and Winter (1982: 9-10) refer to organizations being 
“typically much better at the tasks of self-maintenance in a constant environment than they are at 
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major change, and much better at doing ‘more of the same’ than they are at any other kind of 
change”. In other words, learning is easier if it is related to the familiar (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990). The problem with firm-internal (“local”) sources of inputs to the innovation process is 
that—on their own—they tend to provide limited inspiration and variety for resolving 
innovation-related problems; the local search environment is narrow in terms of opportunities for 
the combination and recombination of knowledge (Chesbrough, 2003; Fleming & Sorenson, 
2004; Laursen & Salter, 2006; Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001; Rothaermel & Alexandre, 2009). Our 
definition of innovation involves the novel integration of previously separate bodies of 
knowledge, thus the availability of variety is central (Metcalfe, 1994). In-house sources of 
knowledge variety, by definition, are limited but beyond the boundaries of the focal organization 
are numerous sources. In the context of R&D worker mobility, inward mobility—regardless of 
origin—provides the hiring firm with access to parts of the previous employer’s organizational 
routines and knowledge bases, which most likely are different from those of the focal firm. 
These internal and external elements can often be fruitfully recombined to produce innovation 
(Kogut & Zander, 1992). In sum, we hypothesize that:  
Hypothesis 1: Joiners contribute more to innovative activity than firm stayers. 
The benefits of hiring university scientists for innovative activity 
The literature on the role of academic science for industry innovation identifies several 
benefits (see, Pavitt, 1991; Salter & Martin, 2001). They can be obtained through the hiring of 
human capital (university researchers) which arguably is an important channel for the 
transmission of science: knowledge transfers in the context of the links between basic science 
and technology “are mainly person-embodied, involving personal contacts, movements, and 
participation in national and international networks” (Pavitt, 1991: 112). We can distinguish 
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three major benefits from employing former academic scientists: 1) their direct and important 
role in technological problem-solving, based on their scientific knowledge; 2) their access to 
networks within the university system, which contributes to their technological problem-solving 
activities; and 3) their application of general scientific research skills and techniques to 
technological problems. Note that these benefits overlap, but for analytical reasons we consider 
them as separate. 
Nelson and Rosenberg suggest that since science is basically concerned with explorative 
learning, scientific knowledge is often directly useful for technological problem-solving in 
private firms. For instance, the general principle related to a pharmaceutical drug may be 
scientific knowledge, but the artifact only becomes a commercial product after a process in 
which scientific and technological knowledge interact. In other words, there are often 
complementarities between scientific and technological knowledge utilized by private firms 
(Agarwal & Ohyama, 2012).  
In this context, Gibbons and Johnston (1974) found that scientists were particularly critical for 
“translating” information from scientific journals into a form that was meaningful to industry 
problem-solvers. Former university scientists also are able to draw on social networks in the 
university system to help their technological problem-solving activities. One of the respondents 
in Gibbons and Johnston’s (1974: 238) study noted that:  
Whenever we had a knotty problem I knew I could always go up to the uni (sic) and talk it 
over with the electronics people I knew from the old days, and what’s more use their 
equipment and library. I kept this quiet and I got a reputation as the man to see with a 
difficult problem.  
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Former university scientists are also able to draw on international networks of colleagues and 
co-authors, which increases the awareness of their employers of the leading scientists in relevant 
fields and their scientific resources (Murray, 2004).  
The third advantage is that former university scientists are able to apply their general research 
skills and techniques to technological problems. Gibbons and Johnston (1974) found that 
scientists presented with a problem may be able to provide a direct solution, but more often will 
suggest alternative ways of tackling it to reduce the range of possibilities, or access equipment 
and procedures to test the feasibility of a solution. At a more general level, Fleming and 
Sorenson (2004) argue that scientific knowledge can lead to other types of searches than local 
technological search, by providing inventors with “map” or a stylized representation of the area 
to be searched. Scientific knowledge differs from knowledge derived from technological practice 
because scientific activity most often involves the generation and testing of theories. Fleming 
and Sorenson (2004) show that science attempts to explain the occurrence of phenomena, and 
suggest means for predicting the results of experiments and the usefulness of new configurations 
of technological components. An understanding (or map) of the fundamental problem, can alter 
the inventor’s search process, leading more directly to useful combinations and eliminating 
fruitless research directions, and by motivating them to persevere even in the face of negative 
results. 
We argue that, given the potentially major benefits to firms of combining scientific 
knowledge, skills and techniques with technological problem-solving activities, hiring university 
scientists compared to recruiting recent graduates and joiners from other firms will have a 
stronger effect on innovation activity. Recent graduates have less scientific experience and less 
involvement in scientific networks than former university researchers, and thus have less 
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“science” to offer the firm. Joiners from other firms are likely to contribute knowledge, skills and 
techniques that are mostly similar to those owned by the focal firm. Song et al. (2003) note, that 
researchers hired from other firms are likely to exhibit local search behaviors and attempt to 
innovate in technological areas close to their existing knowledge (i.e. the previous firm’s 
knowledge). These arguments suggest that:   
Hypothesis 2: Newly hired university researchers make a larger contribution to innovative 
activity than newly hired recent graduates or joiners from other firms. 
The costs of hiring scientists: Investments in absorptive capacity  
While the benefits to firms from science and recruitment of university scientists are evident, 
hiring scientists implies some non-trivial costs for the recruiting firm (additional to the usual cost 
of new hires). These non-trivial costs include the difficulty of integrating university scientists 
into the firm’s local knowledge production. The costs involved in crossing the boundary between 
science and technology are related to fundamental differences in the structure of knowledge 
production in these spheres. Science and technology are similar in that they use similar inputs 
(scientists, engineers, laboratories) and produce similar outputs (knowledge) (Pavitt, 1991) and 
there are some famous examples of exceptional science being performed in the laboratories of 
large industrial firms (Rosenberg, 1990). However, Pavitt (1991) highlights that these 
observations overlook the very different nature and purpose of the core activities of university 
and business laboratories.  
According to Dasgupta and David (1994), the fundamental differences between scientific and 
technological knowledge are the nature of the goals, the norms of behavior (especially regarding 
the disclosure of knowledge) and the reward systems that are considered legitimate by the two 
communities of researchers. Based on these goals, norms and incentives, academically trained 
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scientists tend to have a strong “taste for science” including a preference for basic research, the 
freedom to choose among research projects, and disclosure of research results through 
publications (Agarwal & Ohyama, 2012; Roach & Sauermann, 2010; Stern, 2004). It should be 
noted, however, that industry-employed scientists tend to have a stronger preference for pay and 
a relatively weaker preference for academic freedom when compared to university scientists 
(Sauermann & Stephan, 2012). Also, while industry may often need scientific insights to resolve 
technological problems or to identify new ideas, firms do not gain directly from contributing to 
important scientific questions (Gittelman & Kogut, 2003; Lacetera, 2009). These observations 
suggest that employment of former university scientists may be challenging for profit-oriented 
business firms.  
Firms often respond by allowing employees from academia to have involvement in activities 
such as publishing (Cockburn & Henderson, 1998; Ding, 2011; Roach & Sauermann, 2010; 
Rosenberg, 1990). Nevertheless, integrating individual scientists into the innovative activities of 
for-profit firms can be difficult and can produce tensions. It is necessary to have a deliberate 
strategy involving a laborious process of learning in order to exploit these potentially valuable 
knowledge inputs. In our setting this means firms need a certain level of absorptive capacity in 
order to assimilate university scientists and integrate the important knowledge and skills they 
confer. Cohen and Levinthal (1990: 128) argue that a firms’ absorptive capacity is “largely a 
function of the level of prior related knowledge.” We use this argument to support the idea that 
firms with experience of recruiting university scientists will be more likely and more keen to 
accommodate these scientists and will have learnt how to integrate them in the firm’s knowledge 
production activity. They will be able to cope with employees unaccustomed to the goals, norms 
and incentives of for-profit organizations.  
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In addition to the learning effect, experience of employing former university scientists is a 
signal to university scientists with a real “taste for science” that the firm in question will allow 
their continued involvement in academic activities. Employees with a university science 
background can help identify potential recruits and inform potential candidates about the firm’s 
“science strategy” and work conditions (Ding, 2011). It is particularly important for private firms 
to be able to hire scientists who have a degree of “taste for science” as such a taste is a necessary 
condition for individual scientist’s being able to offer the state-of-the-art scientific skills and 
knowledge that will benefit industrial innovation. In sum, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 3: Firms’ recent experience of hiring university researchers enhances the effect 
of the newly hired university researchers’ contributions to innovative activity.   
Hiring experience and recent graduates 
In their review of the literature on the economic benefits of publicly funded basic research, 
Salter and Martin (2001: 522), conclude that “[m]any studies of the economic benefits of 
publicly funded research identify skilled graduates as the primary benefit that flows to firms” 
because new graduates entering industry bring knowledge about recent scientific research as well 
as scientific skills and techniques. It is inevitable that recent graduates will have less scientific 
experience and will be less deeply embedded in scientific networks. These factors are less 
important if the hiring firm already employs former university scientists because they can help 
train these recent graduate recruits and introduce them to their professional scientific networks. 
The inclusion on firm staff of former university researchers will attract recent graduates with a 
bent for science, while ex-academic scientists can help to identify new graduates with the 
relevant scientific knowledge, skills and techniques among potential recruits to industry. In 
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summary, we suggest that a complementary relationship exists between industrial firms’ recent 
experience of hiring university researchers and their recruitment of recent graduates:    
Hypothesis 4: Firms’ recent hiring of university researchers enhances the contribution to 
innovative activity of newly recruited recent graduates.  
METHODS 
Data  
Patent data. The first set of data is all patent applications filed with the EPO since 1978 
(when the EPO was established) with at least one Danish applicant. These data are taken from 
the EPO's PatStat (“Worldwide Patent Statistical Database”). This data set is critical since our 
measure of innovation is patent counts. Although patent counts clearly are imperfect proxies for 
real innovative activity (Arundel & Kabla, 1998), they provide a proxy for the intermediary 
output, R&D; are representative of a specific invention (patent applications refer to single 
inventions); and can be related to patent value correlates (Trajtenberg, 1990). Patent counts are 
used extensively in the management (Almeida & Kogut, 1999; Song et al., 2003; Stuart & 
Podolny, 1996) and economics literature (Blundell, Griffith, & van Reenen, 1995; Griliches, 
1990; Kim & Marschke, 2005). Our data end in 2004 due to reporting lags at the EPO.  
Matched employer-employee data. We use matched employer-employee information 
provided by Statistics Denmark: our data set includes the whole population of Danish firms and 
workers, not a selected sample. The database is a recognized and valuable resource for research 
in the social sciences (see for instance, Dahl, 2011; Sørensen, 2007, as recent examples of 
applications of these data). Matched employer-employee data are available from 1980. 
Information on the firm-level variables is available from 1999. A structural break in the 
recording of the unique firm identifiers used by Statistics Denmark prevents us from using pre-
1999 information. 
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To create our data set we matched the unique firm identifiers from the firm-level data, with 
each of the patent applicants in our patent data. We achieved a matching for 95 percent of the 
applicants. The unmatched ones are firms that exited before 1999, and would have been excluded 
because our firm-level information begins only in 1999. Since current patent counts are the result 
of past research efforts, we lag all R&D-related variables by one period as in Blundell et al. 
(1999). Therefore the effective starting date of the within-sample period is 2000; 1978-99 is a 
pre-sample period of information on patents used in the estimation (see below). 
Firm identifier numbers make it straightforward to match patent application and firm-level 
data, which essentially contains balance sheet information. Finally we matched these data to our 
employee-level data, which provides information on the highest level of education attained by 
the individual worker, and details of current occupation. We use this information to define our 
population of R&D workers. The employee-level data were aggregated to the firm level before 
being merged, i.e. our estimations consider the total number of R&D workers in each firm.  
We do not consider the whole population of firms since firms with no R&D workers are 
unlikely to patent (see the findings in Kaiser, Kongsted, & Rønde, 2008, using similar data). 
Therefore the final data set is subject to the following restrictions: first, data are for firms with at 
least one R&D worker. R&D workers are defined as individuals aged between 20 and 75, with a 
master’s or PhD degree in technical sciences, natural sciences, veterinary sciences, agricultural 
sciences or health sciences, occupying a job function that requires a “high” (professionals) or 
“intermediate” (technicians and associate professionals) level of skills.2 Second, we include only 
                                                          
2
 The information on job function skill levels was retrieved from the International Standard Classification of 
Occupations (ISCO) published by the International Labor Office, at 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/bureau/stat/isco/isco88/publ4.htm 
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private sector firms (although we consider labor mobility from the public sector). The main 
estimation results are based on 16,531 firm-year observations of 5,714 unique R&D active firms. 
A total of 292 different firms patented at least once within the five years 2000-2004. 
Dependent Variable. Our dependent variable is number of patent applications by firm i in 
year t. In order to account for the skewed patent value distribution (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 
2005; Harhoff, Narin, Scherer, & Vopel, 1999; Lanjouw, Pakes, & Putnam, 1998), we weight 
each patent application by the number of citations received by the patent. More specifically, and 
following Trajtenberg (1990), we weight each patent by 1 plus the number of citations to the 
patent within the three-years following the year of EPO publication.3 
Independent variables. We separate the population of R&D workers into knowledge-intensive 
R&D workers and R&D support workers according to the level of skills required in their current 
occupation. The first group includes people in positions requiring high levels of scientific and 
technological activity, who are the focus of this analysis. The second group defines workers in 
positions requiring an intermediate level of scientific and technological activity, or R&D support 
workers, which are included in our estimations as control variables. We further differentiate 
among knowledge-intensive R&D workers according to mobility status. We identify movement 
between non-affiliated firms, and between universities and firms. The types of workers 
considered are: (i) Stayers who are employed in firm A at time t and time t-1; (ii) Joiners from 
firms who are workers employed in firm A at time t, but are employed in firm B at time t-1; (iii) 
Joiners from universities, defined as workers employed in firm A at time t and at a university at 
                                                          
3
 A 5-year time window is common; we chose a shorter time because our citation data end less than 4 years after the 
patent data. Our patent citation data are from the “EPO/OECD patent citations database”, available from the 
OECD (Webb, Dernis, Harhoff, & Hoisl, 2005) and cover the period 1978-2006. 
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time t-1; (iv) Recent graduate joiners are defined thus irrespective of their previous employment 
status and according only to time since graduation: They acquired their R&D-related education 
in t-1 and were employed in a knowledge-intensive position in firm A at time t.; and (v) Other 
joiners who are employed in firm A at time t and whose employment status at t-1 is unknown.4 
Having defined all the relevant worker types, the employer-employee link is used to aggregate 
the information at firm-level, and then to determine the share of each R&D worker type for each 
firm. 
We control also for a set of variables conventionally considered to be determinants of patent 
activity. First, we include the natural logarithm of the total number of R&D workers—ln(R&D 
workers). Second, we include capital stock, measured as the book value of physical capital— 
ln(capital stock). Third, we control for firm openness to cooperate with other entities using a 
dummy variable that is coded 1 if the firm has co-patented with another legally independent 
firm—Previous cooperation and zero otherwise. We checked manually (on websites) for legal 
independence of respective international co-patentees because our data refer only to Danish 
firms. Fourth, we include a dummy variable for openness defined as co-patenting with a public 
sector entity—Previous cooperation with public sector. Most public-private research endeavors 
in Denmark are set up via a network of nine independent research and technology organizations 
which account for most public sector co-patentees. Fifth, we include a set of sector dummies 
defined according to the two-digit NACE Rev.1 industry classification, and we control for 
regional effects and time-fixed effects using dummy variables. Finally, we account for 
unobserved permanent firm heterogeneity and state dependence as described below. 
                                                          
4
 These are persons who previously were self-employed, were on leave of absence schemes, or entered the country 
(immigrants) between t-1 and t. 
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Model Specification and Estimation 
The patent production function. We assume a Cobb-Douglas knowledge production function 
(Blundell et al., 1995; Hausman, Hall, & Griliches, 1984). Patent output P depends on labor 
input L, capital input K and a term A that captures a set of additional control variables. Labor 
input is split into joiners from firms, LJ, joiners from university research, LU, recent graduates, 
LG, other joiners, LO, stayers, LS and support workers, LP; =  +  +  +  +  + 	. The 
six types of R&D labor enter the patent production function as efficiency units, as in Hellerstein 
et al. (1999) and Galindo-Rueda and Haskel (2005). This enables us to estimate each labor type’s 
relative patent productivity. We normalize the marginal patent productivity of each labor type by 
the marginal patent productivity of stayers, LS, and use natural logarithms to obtain:  

 = ln  + 	ln + 	ln +	 + +  +  + 		,  (1) 
where sk denotes the share of labor type k, sk = Lk/L, and stayers are the omitted reference 
category.  
Count data models. The dependent variable is discrete and takes the values zero or a positive 
integer, making a count data model appropriate. The most popular count data model is Poisson 
regression (Cameron & Trivedi, 1986; Winkelmann, 2008) with an exponential mean function, 
as applied in Hausman et al. (1984). However, the Poisson model assumes equality between 
conditional mean and conditional variance, i.e., equi-dispersion. This assumption is often 
violated when using patent data (Blundell et al., 1995; Cincera, 1997). We chose the Negative 
Binomial model which allows for a more flexible relationship between mean and variance and 
for over-dispersion in the data. Tests for equality of mean and variance also favor the Negative 
Binomial model over the Poisson model. 
19 
 
Unobserved heterogeneity. Our specification controls for firm-specific permanent 
heterogeneity in patenting activity, e.g.,, due to differences in R&D management, different R&D 
investment appropriability conditions, or different technological opportunities. There are two 
commonly used ways to deal with this problem: fixed effects and random effects models. 
Random effects are not plausible in our setting since unobserved permanent heterogeneity most 
likely will be correlated with the regressors. Blundell et al. (1995; 1999) suggest fixed effects to 
proxy for unobserved permanent heterogeneity. Their “pre-sample mean estimator” is developed 
for count data models where the information on the dependent variable covers a longer period 
than the information on the explanatory variables. This applies to our data: the patent data start in 
1978; the firm-level information (allowing for lags) starts in 2000. The estimator uses the 
average of the dependent variable over the pre-sample period as a proxy for correlated fixed 
effects (for each firm). Hence the key assumption here is that the main source of unobserved 
permanent heterogeneity in patent productivity is the pre-sample patent stock. 
The pre-sample mean estimator relies on the stationarity of the dependent variable. Since 
there is a strong upward trend in the number of patent applications, we apply a trend adjustment 
to the proxy variable as suggested by Kaiser et al. (2008). In our practical implementation of the 
fixed effects proxy variable, we follow Blundell et al. (1995; 2002; 1999) and include the natural 
logarithm of the pre-sample mean number of patent applications per firm. For firms with no pre-
sample patent applications, we substitute an arbitrary small constant as in Blundell et al. (1999). 
To account for this non-linear transformation and for the patent count being 0 for most firms, we 
include a dummy variable coded 1 if the firm has at least one pre-sample patent and 0 otherwise. 
State dependence. We control for possible state dependence in patenting activity. Blundell et 
al. (1995) include firm i’s discounted patent stock as an explanatory variable. However, we 
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follow the approach in Crépon and Duguet (1997) and introduce state dependence by including a 
dummy variable for patenting activity in t-1, since this emphasizes recent patenting activity and 
circumvents collinearity problems by using fixed effects proxy variables. 
RESULTS 
Table 1 presents the firm level descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory 
variables. It differentiates between firms with pre-sample patents, i.e., firms with at least one 
patent application before 1999, and firms with no pre-sample patent applications. Stayers 
(63.1%) constitute by far the largest group of R&D workers among current R&D employment, 
followed by support workers (16.1%), and joiners from the private sector (11.5%). Other joiners, 
and recent graduates account for about 4 percent each of the R&D workforce, while joiners from 
university research constitute the smallest employment category at 0.8 percent of all R&D 
workers. In our data, the average firm employs about seven R&D workers; firms with patenting 
activity prior to 1999 employ 21 R&D workers; and firms without pre-sample patents employ 
about 5 R&D workers.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
Table 2 consists of a correlation matrix of our explanatory variables. It shows that the 
correlation between variables is low, confirmed by a mean variance inflation factor (VIF) of 
1.67, which is well below the critical value of 10 suggested by Belsley et al. (1980). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Table 3 presents our estimation results. Note that the coefficient estimates corresponding to 
R&D worker shares do not directly translate into marginal effects, as in ordinary least square 
(OLS) models. However the signs are directly interpretable. For example, a positive coefficient 
of any of the five R&D worker group shares included in the estimation indicates that the 
respective worker group contributes more to innovation than R&D stayers, the comparison 
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group.  
Hypotheses 1 and 2 imply multiple comparisons, so we conduct tests for joint significance. 
Hypothesis 1 refers to three types of joiners (firm joiners, university researchers, university 
graduates) whose effect on patenting is compared to the contribution of stayers. We test 
separately for each of these mobile labor types’ contributions to patenting compared to that of 
stayers, and apply joint tests for firm joiners, university researchers and university graduates 
contributing more than stayers. The results for the joint significance tests and the findings related 
to Hypothesis 2 (comparing university researchers with firm joiners and also with university 
graduates) are presented in Table 4.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
Hypothesis 1 states that joiners (of any type) contribute more to innovative activity than 
stayers. Table 3 Model I shows that the effects of joiners from firms, other joiners and university 
researchers are all positive and significantly different from the effect of stayers on innovative 
output, but that the effects of graduate joiners and support workers are not. When we look at the 
joint effect (stayers vs. the three different types of joiners—see Table 4), we find clear support 
for our hypothesis because the joint test is significant at the 1 percent level. The results are also 
consistent with Hypothesis 2 that newly hired university researchers contribute more to 
innovative activity than newly hired recent graduates or joiners from (other) firms. First, the 
coefficient of the share of university researchers is large, and significant at the 1 percent level 
(see Table 3, Model I). Second, the joint test for the effect of hiring university researchers 
compared to the effects of newly hired recent graduates and joiners from firms is significant at 
the 5 percent level (see Table 4).  
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
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Hypotheses 3 and 4 refer to firm j having hired a university researcher in the recent past. 
Recent experience in hiring university researchers is defined as hiring by firm j at t-2. To test 
Hypothesis 3 we interact this dummy variable with the share of university researchers firm j 
hired at t. To test Hypothesis 4 we interact the dummy variable for past experience of hiring 
university researchers with the share of recent graduates. We find support for Hypothesis 3 that 
recent experience of hiring a university researcher enhances the contribution of new university 
recruits to innovative activity. Table 3, Model II, shows that the effect of the share of newly 
hired university researchers at t-1 interacted with the share of recently hired university 
researchers at t-2 is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Note that the main effect of 
newly hired university researchers at t-1, disappears when the interaction term is inserted into the 
regression. Thus absorptive capacity matters. Hypothesis 4 proposed that experience of hiring 
university researchers enhances the contribution of newly hired recent graduates to innovative 
activity. Our results provide strong support for this hypothesis: the interaction effect of newly 
hired recent graduates and the share of hired university researchers at t-2 is positive and 
statistically highly significant. In contrast, in Model II the coefficient of (non-interacted) 
graduate joiners is statistically insignificant. This indicates that only firms with experience of 
hiring university researchers are able to benefit from current hiring of university graduates, 
which highlights the importance of absorptive capacity. 
Table 5 presents the marginal effects. Marginal effects provide information on the absolute 
change in the expected number of patent applications due to an increase of one in the number of 
workers from a particular skill group. Marginal effects are linearly dependent on the number of 
the firm’s patent applications, which implies that marginal effects are 0 if the firm did not apply 
for a patent. Table 5 presents the marginal effects across (i) all firms, (ii) firms with patents in 
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the period under consideration, and (iii) firms with pre-sample patents. We present marginal 
effects also for the average firm had it applied for a patent (the same calculation as in (i) but with 
exactly 1 patent “artificially” assigned to each firm). 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Starting with the specification with no interaction, Table 5 shows that university joiners make 
the largest contribution to firms’ patenting. Across all firms, one additional university researcher 
leads to 0.09 additional patents. The effect is substantially larger for firms with pre-sample 
patents (0.20); for firms with a patent in the period under consideration (0.35); and the average 
firm with one patent (0.29). Both firm joiners and graduate joiners add 0.04 new patents; there is 
no statistically significant difference between these two types of workers. The marginal effect for 
support workers is 0.02. The marginal effects are statistically insignificant for other joiners and 
R&D stayers. 
The marginal effects for the specification with the interaction for previous hires of university 
researchers confirms our finding about the importance of past hires for innovation. Table 5 
shows that the marginal effect of university researchers is 0.20—five additional workers generate 
one additional patent for firms with experience of university researcher hires (across all 
observations). For the average firm with one patent and past university researcher hires, the 
marginal effect is 0.53; i.e., two additional workers generate one additional patent. In contrast, 
the marginal effect of recruiting a university researcher is statistically insignificant for firms with 
no experience of hiring university researchers. We find similar results for recent university 
graduates. The marginal effect is 0.15 for firms with past university researcher hires and 
substantially larger than the effect for firm joiners at 0.03. However, firm joiners is the only 
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group that statistically significantly adds to the patenting activity of firms without university 
researcher hires. The marginal effect is 0.05 for this type of worker across all firms. 
ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS AND ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
In this section we discuss whether there may be other factors driving our estimation results, 
and run alternative models to check whether our results hold in different settings. For reasons of 
space the estimations and results are not presented here. Alternative explanations for our results 
include differences in experience and education among worker groups. Mobile workers might be 
more experienced and better educated than non-mobile workers (related to Hypothesis 1), and 
this might be true also of joiners from university research versus recent graduates and joiners 
from other firms (related to Hypothesis 2). This might be an alternative explanation for our 
empirical results. However, inspection of our data lends additional support to Hypothesis 1: 
mobile workers tend to be less experienced and less well educated than their stayer peers, and 
this holds also for recent graduates and joiners from firms. 
When comparing joiners from university research and recent graduates, as expected, we find 
clear differences in experience and formal education levels. However, both these differences can 
be regarded as integral to the predicted differences in the amount and quality of the scientific and 
technical human capital accumulated by workers in either group; thus our descriptive findings 
are consistent with Hypothesis 2. In relation to the timing of moves between academe and 
industry it seems that most moves out of university employment are the result of unfavorable 
tenure decisions, and therefore work against the effect of positive selection after graduation.   
We observe also that firm joiners on average are more experienced than joiners from 
university research. This effect would tend to offset our results and hence reinforces our 
interpretation based on the theoretical model. Education levels are higher among joiners from 
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university research, which is consistent with our interpretation that the differential effect between 
joiners from university research and firm joiners is driven by the better ability of university 
scientists to re-combine scientific skills and techniques and by access to useful social networks. 
These considerations support Hypothesis 2. A final alternative explanation for our findings might 
be that university researchers and university graduates tend to want to participate in patent-
intensive sectors. However, our data show that this is not the case. These alternative explanations 
tend to reinforce our actual findings. 
We conducted robustness checks for whether not applying citation weighting changes the 
findings. The results of the main model in Table 3 are fully supported when citation weights are 
not applied to our dependent variable although the corresponding coefficient estimates and 
marginal effects are slightly smaller compared to the specification with citation weights. Finally, 
we analyzed to what extent very patenting active firms—possibly very relevant in a small 
economy such as Denmark—and the chemicals sector (which includes biotechnology) which is a 
particularly patent active sector, matter for the results. We found that neither the exclusion of 
neither very patenting active firms nor firms in the chemicals industry substantially affects our 
estimation results for the baseline model. However, the corresponding coefficient estimates and 
the marginal effects are smaller than for the full data.  
CONCLUDING DISCUSSION 
This paper started from the proposition that firms’ hiring of university researchers can provide 
important support for boundary-spanning search which leads to more firm-level innovation. Our 
empirical approach took account of state dependence and unobserved firm-specific time-
invariant heterogeneity. We found support for the general idea that inward mobility of 
researchers has a positive effect on the level of innovative activities in private business firms. 
More specifically, we demonstrated that newly hired university researchers play a greater role in 
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affecting innovative activity than newly hired recent graduates or joiners from firms, but only if 
the hiring firms have recent experience of recruiting university researchers. We observed also 
that firms’ recent experience of hiring university researchers enhances the effect of newly hired 
recent graduates’ contributions to innovative activity. 
Our study adds to the existing research. First, we contribute by extending the theoretical and 
empirical underpinnings of the resource-based view (RBV) of the firm. The RBV suggests that 
variations in investment choices over resources, drive variations in firm performance. However, 
the RBV provides little information on how firms identify opportunities and make ex-ante 
investments that become valuable ex-post. Although proponents of the RBV acknowledge that 
recruitment from outside may enable firms to overcome the constraints on firm growth imposed 
by internal resources and capabilities (Barney, 1991; Penrose, 1959), the theory does not explain 
how such recruitment helps to generate innovation and value. The knowledge-based view can be 
considered an extension of the RBV. It states that a firm’s competitive advantage depends on its 
ability to combine previously separate bodies of knowledge, however, it is not precise about how 
these elements should be combined to create this competitive advantage. Although we do not 
provide complete solutions, we make a contribution by providing a set of micro mechanisms that 
underpin how newly recruited human capital in the form of university scientists can provide 
important inputs to the innovation process in private business firms.  
We contribute also to the organizational learning literature (Levinthal & March, 1993; 
Rosenkopf & Nerkar, 2001) by establishing theoretically—and corroborating empirically—that 
recruiting university researchers is an important way to overcome local search problems at firm 
level. We also explicitly address the important costs of this boundary-spanning search. 
Empirically, we found only positive effects from hiring recent graduates and university 
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researchers provided that the focal firm has some experience of hiring university researchers: in 
line with the idea proposed by Cohen and Levinthal (1990) and Rosenberg (1990) in the context 
of private firms’ absorptive capacity, knowledge is not a public good and its absorption requires 
substantial and specific investment. It should be noted that the effect of absorptive capacity is 
likely to have been underestimated in our results. It is possible that the positive effect of hiring 
the first university scientist will be potentially higher than the effect derived from hiring the nth 
scientist, given the high potential for knowledge recombination. Other things being equal, this 
would imply a negative interaction effect of newly hired university researchers at t-1 interacted 
with the share of recently hired university researchers at t-2. However, we found a positive 
effect, indicating that the ability to utilize these potentially valuable sources of knowledge, skills, 
and techniques needs to be learnt through a laborious and painstaking process.  
Finally, we contribute to the literature on university-industry interactions. We show that the 
transfer of knowledge between universities and private business firms is not confined to formal 
research cooperation and joint research projects, the assumption in much of the literature. Public-
private transfer of knowledge is also achieved through mobility of university researchers and 
hiring of recent graduates, which we show have sizeable economic and statistically highly 
significant effects on the innovative activity of private firms. 
The findings from this study have implications for managerial practice. For example, the 
contribution of R&D stayers is small in both absolute and relative terms, which suggests that 
firms need to devise strategies to keep their worker stock up-to-date with science and 
engineering developments. This might include initiatives to facilitate exchanges of knowledge 
between academia and industry. Hiring from academia should of course reduce the adverse 
effects of knowledge decay, prompting the question of why industry does not recruit more from 
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universities, especially given our finding that the direct contribution to patenting activity of 
stayers is much lower than that of mobile workers. We would suggest that the reason might be 
related to “endogenous absorptive capacity” (Arora & Gambardella, 1990; Cockburn & 
Henderson, 1998; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Zahra & George, 2002). Certainly, our results 
suggest that absorptive capacity is crucially important in this context: firms with no prior 
experience of hiring university researchers may find it difficult to integrate them into their 
knowledge production.  
This study has some limitations. As already noted, we model only one particular antecedent to 
absorptive capacity: previous experience of hiring and integrating university researchers. While 
this approach has advantages in our context, future research could model more facets of the 
notion of absorptive capacity. Also, Fleming and Sorenson (2004) suggest that scientific thinking 
for performing technological search is more important when technologies are tightly coupled. 
We need to investigate whether hiring university scientists is more beneficial for firm-level 
innovative activity in firms working with tightly coupled technologies compared to firms 
engaged in less closely connected technologies. Insights from this research could inform 
management decisions about R&D worker recruitment, and the types of workers that would 
bring the most benefits. 
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TABLE 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
  
  
All obs. 
 
Obs. w/o pre-
sample patent 
Obs. w/ pre-
sample patent   
  Mean 
Std. 
dev. Mean 
Std. 
dev. Mean Std. dev. 
# Patent applications, citations weighted 0.294 4.375 0.060 1.653 2.239 12.282 
# Patent applications, citations unweighted 0.115 0.267 0.117 0.272 0.101 0.218 
Joiners from firms 0.115 0.267 0.117 0.272 0.101 0.218 
Other joiners 0.008 0.072 0.008 0.073 0.012 0.065 
Recent graduate joiners 0.044 0.178 0.046 0.184 0.023 0.111 
Joiners from universities  0.040 0.160 0.041 0.165 0.035 0.113 
R&D support workers 0.161 0.331 0.157 0.332 0.192 0.318 
ln(capital stock) at t-1 15.170 2.845 14.890 2.744 17.493 2.586 
ln(R&D workers) at t-1 0.790 1.079 0.703 0.980 1.516 1.503 
 Previous cooperation (dummy) 0.011 --- 0.002 --- 0.083 ---  
 Previous coop. with public sector (dummy) 0.001 --- 0.000 --- 0.005 ---  
ln(adj. # patents in 1990, citations weighted) -11.119 1.228 --- --- -7.855 1.434 
ln(adj. # patents in 1990) -11.094 1.271 --- --- -7.624 1.229 
 Patent at t-1 (dummy) 0.039 0.194 0.010 0.098 0.284 0.451  
Positive patent stock in 1990 (dummy) 0.108 --- 0.000 --- 1.000 --- 
  # obs. 16,531   14,750   1,781     
Note: Descriptive statistics for the entire set of observations, for observations of firms with pre-sample 
patents and those with no pre-sample patents. 
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TABLE 2  
Correlations  
  
  
  
1. 2. 3 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.   
1. # Patent applications, citations weighted     
2. Joiners from firms 0.006     
3 Recent graduate joiners 0.027 -0.025     
4. Other joiners -0.022 -0.076 -0.020   
5. Joiners from universities 0.010 -0.068 -0.001 -0.039     
6. R&D support workers -0.002 -0.162 -0.045 -0.101 -0.103     
7. ln(capital stock)  0.207 -0.010 -0.019 -0.061 -0.042 0.168     
8. ln(R&D workers)  0.264 -0.032 0.002 -0.060 0.003 -0.021 0.337    
9. ln(adj. # patents in 1990, citations weighted) 0.524 -0.016 0.019 -0.036 -0.009 0.017 0.295 0.303    
10. Previous cooperation 0.438 -0.019 0.020 -0.040 -0.013 0.032 0.284 0.230 0.924     
11. Previous coop. with public sector 0.225 -0.009 0.019 -0.010 -0.004 -0.018 0.108 0.188 0.324 0.243    
  12. Positive patent stock in 1990 0.026 -0.003 0.004 -0.004 0.001 -0.007 0.004 0.023 0.051 0.050 0.017   
Note: The specification includes sector, year and region dummies. For reasons of space, the correlations are not displayed here. 
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TABLE 3  
Main Estimation Results 
Model I 
W/o interactions 
Model II 
W/ interactions 
  Coeff. Std. Err. Coeff. Std. Err. 
Labor type shares (base: R&D stayers) at t-1 
Joiners from firms 0.789 0.196 ** 0.953 0.320 ** 
Recent graduate joiners 0.843 0.315 ** 0.630 0.822 
Other joiners 0.226 0.396 -0.603 0.719 
Joiners from universities 1.909 0.516 ** 0.219 1.268 
R&D Support workers 0.298 0.207 0.273 0.238 
Interactions 
Hired uni.res. at t-2 *  joiners from universities at t-1 --- --- 4.112 2.115 * 
Hired uni.res. at t-2 * grad. joiners at t-1 --- --- 2.698 1.269 * 
Hired uni. res. at t-2 --- --- 0.097 0.190 
Other innovative inputs 
ln(capital stock)  0.175 0.033 ** 0.171 0.040 ** 
ln(R&D workers)  0.232 0.056 ** 0.188 0.068 ** 
 Controls for previous co-patenting        
 Previous cooperation 0.294 0.162 † 0.500 0.374   
 Previous cooperation with public sector -0.109 0.504  0.349 0.175 *  
State dependence & dynamics 
Patent at t-1 1.405 0.168 ** 1.464 0.192 ** 
ln(adj. # patents in 1990, citations weighted) 0.318 0.076 ** 0.287 0.090 ** 
Positive patent stock in 1990  0.293 0.280  0.500 0.374  
# obs. & # unique firms 
# obs. 16,531 10,585 
  # unique firms 5,714     3,880       
Note: The dependent variable is the number of the firm’s citations-weighted patent applications per year. The 
estimation results are generated by Pre Sample Mean Estimation. Our specification also includes year, sector and 
region dummy variables.  
† p < .10 
*  p < .05 
** p < .01 
Two-tailed tests for controls, one-tailed tests for hypothesized variables.  
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TABLE 4  
Hypotheses Tests 
 
  Model I Model II  
  
    W/o interactions W/ interactions   
    χ
2
 dof   χ2 dof   
H1: firm joiners contribute more to innovative activity than 
stayers. 
H1a - Joiners from firms vs. stayers: 16.28 1 ** 8.88 1 ** 
H1b - Recent graduates vs. stayers: 7.15 1 ** 0.59 1  
H1c - Joiners from universities vs. stayers: 13.68 1 ** 0.03 1  
H1 joint: 29.24 3 ** 9.07 3 ** 
H2: Newly hired university researchers give a stronger contribution to innovative 
activity than recently hired recent graduates or joiners from firms. 
H2a - Recent graduates: 4.56 1 ** 0.32 1 
H2b - Joiners from firms: 3.28 1 * 0.07 1 
H2 Joint: 4.56 2 * 0.48 2 
H3: Firms' recent experience in hiring university researchers enhances the effect of 
newly hired university researchers' contribution to innovative activity. 
--- --- 3.78 1 * 
H4: Firms' recent experience in hiring university researchers enhances the effect of 
newly hired recent graduates' contribution to innovative activity. 
  
    --- ---   4.52 1 **   
Note: “χ2” corresponds to a Wald test for (joint) significance. The test results are based on the estimation results 
displayed in Table 2. "dof" denote the degrees of freedom underlying the test. 
† p < .10 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
One-tailed tests.  
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TABLE 5  
Marginal Effects at Means 
  
  
All obs. 
 
Firms w/ at least 
one patent 
Firms w/ at least 
one pre-sample 
patent 
Average firm w/ 
one patent 
 
  ME p-val. ME p-val. ME p-val. ME p-val.  
Specification w/o interaction with past hires of university researchers (Model I)   
Joiners from firms 0.036 0.000 0.145 0.000 0.087 0.000 0.124 0.000  
Recent graduate joiners 0.039 0.003 0.155 0.003 0.092 0.002 0.132 0.003  
Other joiners 0.011 0.484 0.043 0.527 0.028 0.473 0.039 0.484  
Joiners from universities 0.086 0.000 0.348 0.000 0.204 0.000 0.291 0.000  
R&D support workers 0.015 0.044 0.056 0.058 0.035 0.037 0.050 0.044  
Stayers 0.001 0.558 0.002 0.816 0.004 0.366 0.004 0.558  
Specification w/o interaction with past hires of university researchers (Model II)   
Firms with university graduate hire in t-2   
Joiners from firms 0.039 0.012 0.141 0.022 0.088 0.015 0.106 0.012  
Recent graduate joiners 0.150 0.002 0.589 0.002 0.345 0.002 0.406 0.002  
Other joiners -0.033 0.323 -0.153 0.262 -0.080 0.305 -0.090 0.323  
Joiners from universities 0.197 0.016 0.778 0.018 0.454 0.016 0.533 0.016  
R&D support workers 0.008 0.532 0.013 0.795 0.015 0.602 0.021 0.532  
Stayers -0.005 0.558 -0.039 0.265 -0.015 0.462 -0.014 0.558  
Firms without university graduate hire in t-2   
Joiners from firms 0.048 0.000 0.187 0.001 0.110 0.001 0.130 0.012  
Recent graduate joiners 0.033 0.377 0.126 0.396 0.075 0.383 0.089 0.002  
Other joiners -0.025 0.455 -0.106 0.426 -0.058 0.448 -0.067 0.323  
Joiners from universities  0.014 0.815 0.049 0.837 0.031 0.821 0.037 0.016  
R&D support workers 0.016 0.076 0.059 0.113 0.037 0.085 0.044 0.532  
  Stayers 0.004 0.174 0.007 0.552 0.007 0.252 0.010 0.558  
Note: Based on the estimation results in Table 2. The top panel refers to the specification without 
interactions with the dummy variable for past university hires, the two lower panels refer to the 
specification with interactions included. Marginal effects are evaluated at the means of the 
involved variables. E.g., 1 additional joiner from a private firm is related to 0.039 additional 
citations-weighted patents for the firms in the specification with no past university hires 
interactions. 
 
 
